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The Nature of  the “In-Between”
in D.W. Winnicott’s Concept of  Transitional Space
and in Martin Buber’s das Zwischenmenschliche
Laura Praglin 
Introduction 
Martin Buber (1878-1965), German Jewish social philosopher and theologian, and D.W. Win-
nicott (1896-1971), British pediatrician and psychoanalyst, portray in vibrant detail the reality of  
the “in-between”. Although contemporaries, they were separated by country and profession, and 
did not know each other. Yet both set forth in their writings remarkably complementary views 
concerning “in-between space”--the transitional area, to Winnicott, or das Zwischenmenschliche to 
Buber. This is a meeting-ground of  potentiality and authenticity, located neither within the self  
nor in the world of  political and economic affairs. In this space, one finds the most authentic 
and creative aspects of  our personal and communal existence, including artistic, scientific, and 
religious expression.
 The creative and moral implications of  the “in-between” continue to resonate deeply, 
and to claim the attention of  recent scholars. Decades after their original contributions, we 
witness an ongoing engagement of  Buber and Winnicott within a variety of  interdisciplinary 
contexts. Fields as varied as philosophy, theology, politics, health care, communication, gender 
studies, and psychology continue to employ the work of  these two thinkers when grappling with 
the themes of  intersubjectivity, dialogue, and moral responsibility.1 On the relevance of  Buber’s 
relational concept of  the self, for instance, Fishbane writes the following: 
His vision, though formulated decades ago, is remarkably resonant with current voices in family 
therapy and other fields, which are reformulating fundamental assumptions about personhood 
and therapy. Within family therapy, psychoanalysis, human development, and gender studies, 
traditional notions of  the self  are being challenged. In multiple contexts of  research and theory, 
older ideas about independence and separation-individuation are giving way to a view of  the 
person in more relational, interdependent terms. 2
 See, for instance, C. Fred Alford, “Levinas and Winnicott: Motherhood and Responsibility,” American Imago 57, 
no. 3 (Fall 2000): 235-259; Gal Gerson, “Individuality, Deliberation and Welfare in Donald Winnicott,” History of  
the Human Sciences 18, no. 1 (2005): 107-126; P. Wilkin, In Search of  the True Self: A Clinical journey Through the 
Vale of  Soul-Making,” Journal of  Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 13, 1 (2006): 12–18; Richard Blackwell, “Hold-
ing, Containing and Bearing Witness,” Journal of  Social Work Practice, 11, no. 2 (1997): 81-89; Mona D. Fishbane, 
“I, Thou, and We: A Dialogical Approach to Couples Therapy,” Journal of  Marital and Family Therapy 24, no. 1(Jan. 
1998) 41-58; Paul Genova, “There are only Three Kinds of  Psychotherapy,” Psychiatric Times 18, issue 11 (Novem-
ber 2001), Retrieved 5/15/06 at http://www.psychiatric times.com/p011140.html.
 Fishbane, 41. 
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 Such dialogical aspects of  Buber’s and Winnicott’s thought have particular significance 
for psychotherapy, and most past writings about these thinkers focus upon this area. Yet other 
pivotal aspects of  their thought have been rarely explored outside the psychological realm, 
especially how this “in-between” space harbors culture and imagination; provides for art and 
symbol; and helps in the ethical and spiritual regeneration of  the wider world.
 Buber and Winnicott communicate in clear, poetic styles remarkable for either of  their 
professions. Their prose is purposely open-ended, “with a clear wish to have the reader fill in 
his [or her] own experiences.”3 Both are also noted for their unusual respect for individual au-
tonomy; for unconditional acceptance of  others; and for the search for mutuality in personal 
relationships. 
 As a result of  their varied disciplines and training, Buber remains more vague and skepti-
cal about the psychological element, whereas Winnicott is less specific about the social and cul-
tural realities. Although Buber shows more wariness of  the inner and psychological dimensions 
of  human existence, he does not dismiss the insights of  the psychological sciences--provided 
they do not purport to define the essence of  the person. Yet Buber finds psychology as a whole 
too quick to classify the world and the person into subject/object dichotomies, and thus its abil-
ity to engage the dialogical realm remains inadequate. Buber concludes that although human 
nature is a social product, persons still possess a great degree of  freedom and responsibility. As a 
result, Buber asserts that behavioristic psychologies must be rejected, since they leave little room 
for genuine freedom. He denounces those psychologies, for instance, which insist that therapeu-
tic change succeeds because the person adapts new habits to better fit cultural realities.4 
The Transitional Space: Between Subject and Object
Like his mentor, Georg Simmel, Buber attempts to combine philosophy with social and psycho-
logical theory. In a preface to die Gesellschaft in 1906, Buber first calls forth the concept of  das 
Zwischenmenschliche5, which he later refines to mean the dialogical realm, the world of  relatedness 
between persons. He contrasts this to the impersonal domain of  social collectivity characteristic 
of  mass society. Buber’s focus on meaningful relatedness is pursued foremost in his seminal 
1923 study, I and Thou,6 where he outlines two ways of  being in the world: the modes of  I-It and 
I-Thou. In the realm of  the I-It, persons treat each other as objects. In the realm of  I -Thou, 
persons seek to relate meaningfully to others. We must live in both worlds, Buber insists, yet 
only in the world of  the I-Thou do persons relate with their whole being, and only here is true 
dialogue and relationship possible.7 The true hallmark of  maturity and health becomes the suc-
cessful negotiation of  this twofold nature of  existence. 
 Influenced by psychoanalysts Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein, Winnicott proposes 
original ideas regarding the role of  transitional phenomena within early development and in 
later life. Contrary to both the behaviorists and the neo-Freudians, moreover, Winnicott simlarly 
contends that the pivotal issue in psychology is the specific relations of  the individual with others 
 
3 Ernst Ticho, “Donald Winnicott, Martin Buber and the Theory of  Interpersonal Relationships,” Psychiatr y: 
Journal for the Study of  Interpersonal Processes 37, no. 3 (Aug. 1974): 240.
 Buber, Martin. The Knowledge of  Man. Ed. M. Friedman (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 166-184. 
 Martin Buber, Die Gesellschaft, Sammlung sozial-psychologischer Monographien [Society. A Collection of  Social-Psycho-
logical Monographs] (Frankfurt am Main: Rütten & Loening, 1906-1912, 40 volumes. The first volume (Werner 
Sombart, Das Proletariat) includes the introduction to the series, and proposes the term “das Zwischenmenschli-
che.”
 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons,, 1958).
 Buber, I and Thou, 3-5.
03
in the world, and not the satisfaction of  instinctual drives. Although Winnicott finds that 
“objects”--a term that includes persons--with which the infant relates are crucial in gratifying 
instincts, the child’s engagement with objects remains primarily a relational one from the start 
of  life.
 In a speech to the British Psycho-Analytical Society in 1966, Winnicott describes the 
evolution of  his thought. At first he worshipped Freud unquestioningly, viewing play and sym-
bolism as expressions of  the structure of  the mind, universally projected onto the wider world. 
However, he gradually realized that “Freud did not have a place in his topography of  the mind 
for the experience of  things cultural.” He also began to realize that the infant, for instance in 
play, had its own point of  view, different from that of  its parents or observers:
For a long time my mind remained in a state of  not-knowing. . .  I played about with the concept 
of  ‘mental representations’ . . . in terms of  objects and phenomena located in the personal psychic 
reality, felt to be inside. . . also, I followed the effects of  the operation of  the mental mechanisms 
of  projection and introjection. I realized, however, that play is in fact neither a matter of  inner 
psychic reality nor a matter of  external reality.8 
 
Infancy: The Beginning of  the In-Between
Winnicott focuses upon how an infant moves from a sense of  illusory merged omnipotence with 
the mother and gains psychic structure, or a relatively firm sense of  self. He also asks how a child 
copes with object loss or an unresponsive social environment. Central to these concerns is his 
idea of  transitional phenomena, which arise in the context of  “good-enough mothering,” within 
a facilitating environment. Transitional objects, the infant’s first “not-me” possession(s), are uni-
versal and of  infinite variety. They come into play from about four to twelve months, given the 
normal provisions of  good parental care and an adequate holding environment. Although they 
are actual objects (e.g. a blanket or thumb), these transitional objects are not yet perceived by 
the infant as having a fully external reality. They are symbolic of  a third reality, a resting place 
that exists “in between” subject and object--between that which is merged with the mother, and 
that which is outside and separate. The transitional objects preserve the illusion of  symbiosis 
with the mother, “thus allowing the infant the illusion that what the infant creates really exists.” 
It mediates the inevitable disillusionment process inherent in the gradual establishment of  ego 
boundaries as the child begins to “distinguish between fantasy and fact, inner and outer, similar-
ity and difference.” 
 While Winnicott, as a pediatrician and psychoanalyst, focuses upon critical ear-
ly experiences and realities of  human development, including serious emotional loss leading 
to life-long psychic trauma, Buber, the social philosopher, assumes that most adults have 
the capacity to relate meaningfully, rarely referring to deficits in emotional development. 
Buber also differs from many psychologists in positing an inherent relationality of  child 
from the start of  life:  “In the beginning is relation--as category of  being, readiness, grasp-
ing form, mould for the soul; it is the a priori of  relation, the inborn Thou”9 This distinguished 
Buber from many psychological theorists, who contend that an infant first regards his/her 
mother “as a part-object, an It, and only gradually relates to her as a whole person, a Thou.” 
Rather, the infant-mother relationship is, from the start, a mutual I-Thou relationship. 
Eventually, however, Buber writes, the child must “fall” into a state of  differentiation and in 
 
 
 D.W. Winnicott, Playing and Reality (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1971), 112.
 Buber, I and Thou, 27. 
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dividuation. Yet it is an “exalted” fall, because this inevitable move from I-Thou to I-It is an 
accomplishment which made the essential I--Thou encounter possible. Buber thus formulates a 
significant distinction between the mature or “essential Thou on the level of  self-being” and the 
immature or “primitive Thou [which] precedes the consciousness of  individual separateness.”10
Yet, how may a small child, who is not yet fully conscious of  his/her separateness, achieve the 
“distance” necessary for I-Thou relation? This question remains problematic to several Buber 
critics. Buber depicts the primitive I-Thou as a “category of  being, a readiness. . .the a priori of  
relation,” which “does not rely on a distinction between oneness and separateness, but on a more 
fundamental distinction between a newborn’s concrete experience, on the one hand, and the 
existential conditions which make him human, on the other: 
The primitive I-Thou [is] a description of  the fundamental characteristics which make an infant a 
human being, while the ‘essential’ I-Thou is a description of  the kind of  relations that are possible 
in mature mutual relationships. Thus, the primitive I-Thou signifies that an essential constituent 
of  being human is to be always in-relation-to-someone.”11
Despite its ability to provide refuge and renewal, however, Winnicott and Buber insist that this 
“in-between” world can never displace or supplant the inner and outer worlds. Whether in child-
hood or adulthood, we cannot stay in this realm of  creative possibility and transformation for-
ever, even if  it is the most real and authentic part of  our existence. Buber and Winnicott there-
fore refuse to become neo-romantic worshippers of  feeling and subjectivity. They avoid such 
dualism, and discourage, in Buber’s terms, the rejection of  the world of  I-It, suggesting instead 
the interpenetration of  the I-It realm by that of  I-Thou. 
 Like the child, we must return always to the “exalted melancholy of  our fate” in the I-It 
world: Yet Buber insists that even in this mundane sphere, we can claim a sense of  meaning, for 
“these Thou’s which have been changed into It’s have it in their nature to change back again into 
presentness.”12
 Winnicott’s transitional object, an illusion in itself, remains paradoxically for all persons 
“the basis of  initiation of  experience.” This intermediate area of  experience, in which the tran-
sitional object shares, is retained throughout life, “in the intense experiencing that belongs to 
the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work.”13 Winnicott’s 
“in-between” world does not possess the vacillating It/Thou qualities to the same degree that 
Buber’s does, and remains a more stable and enduring concept, available to draw upon for the 
rest of  our lives.
Reflections Upon the Imagination
The key to the “in-between” realm in infancy involves fantasy, but the capacity to call upon fanta-
sy first requires the sensitive response of  adults around the child. “[W]e agree never to make the 
challenge to the baby: did you create this object, or did you find it conveniently lying around?” 
Winnicott suggests. “That is to say, an essential feature of  transitional phenomena and objects is 
 
 
10 Charles Brice, “Pathological Modes of  Human Relating and Therapeutic Mutuality: A Dialogue Between Buber’s 
Existential: Theory and Object-Relations Theory.” Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of  Interpersonal Processes 47, no. 2 
(May, 1984): 116.
 Ibid., 118.
 Buber, I and Thou, 16, 23
3 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 16.
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a quality in our attitude when we observe them.”14  As a result, through transitional objects, the 
earliest “not-me” possession, the child both uses symbol and experiences play for the first time. 
 Although more hesitant about the imaginal or “fanciful” realm than Winnicott, Buber 
describes a child’s interaction with a teddy bear in I and Thou in terms similar to those of  Win 
nicott. The child’s experience is not a relation to an object, but is “the correspondence of  the 
child--to be sure only ‘fanciful’--with what is alive and effective over against him.”15 This “is the 
instinct to make everything into Thou, to give relation to the universe,” notes Buber. “Little, 
disjointed, meaningless sounds still go out into the void, but one day, unforeseen, they will have 
become conversation.”16
 Buber’s comment regarding the critical importance of  conversation evokes Winnicott’s 
story of  a boy and his string. Winnicott is asked to evaluate a young boy, whose primary means 
of  communication is with a length of  string he always carries with him. His obsession with string 
begins at the time of  separation from his depressive mother, and becomes stronger whenever 
subsequent bouts of  depression and detachment separated mother and child. “String can be 
looked upon as an extension of  all other techniques of  communication,” Winnicott suggests. 
“String joins, just as it also helps in the wrapping up of  objects and in the holding of  uninte-
grated material. In this respect string has a symbolic meaning.”17 Winnicott posits that if  the 
string remained attached to “lived concreteness” (in Buber’s words)—i.e., the original wish to 
maintain contact with the mother--it is more likely that the boy can be helped. If  the string is 
only symbolic, without retaining its original meaning, cure becomes much more difficult. The 
predicament Winnicott observes is that “the function of  the string is changing from communica-
tion into a denial of  separation”: 
As a denial of  separation, string becomes a thing in itself. . .  When hope is absent and string 
represents a denial of  separation, then a much more complex state of  affairs has arisen—one that 
becomes difficult to cure, because of  the secondary gains that arise out of  the skill that develops 
wherever an object has to be handled in order to be mastered.18
Art and the Creative Process
For Winnicott, life itself  is always expressed in symbol, for it plays an integral part in the formu-
lation and realization of  transitional space. Yet, paradoxically, not even an artist creates entirely 
new symbols and forms, only, like the child, discovers them. As a result, Winnicott remarks, 
“creative living involves, in every detail of  its experience, a philosophical dilemma–because, in 
fact, in our sanity we only create what we find.”19
 Such creativity, declares Winnicott--whether artistic, religious, or scientific—is “the do-
ing that arises out of  being.”20 Using Winnicott’s terms, we may say that the artist, for example, 
expresses his/her being by constructing a framed, transitional area in which creativity finds ex-
pression. The artist creates and recreates unconscious processes, and presents these in a manner 
which resonate with our shared sense of  symbols. By articulating these shared symbols, the artist 
invites us into this intermediate area of  experiencing. The poet, for example, chooses symbols 
and images of  a common language, and finds comfort not available in herself. S/he invites others 
 
 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 113.
 Buber, I and Thou, 27.
 Ibid., 26, 27.
17 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 22.
 Ibid., 22.
19 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 53.
20 Ibid., 39.
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 into this in-between space, beyond the merely private, subjective, or psychological, which serves 
as a resting place between inner and outer reality, between psyche and culture. Through art, 
therefore, one can move from the private to the social world. Readers find meaning as well, be-
cause they now share in the capacity to articulate experience. Creative expression--through art, 
philosophy, religion or mathematics—may thus resolve situations, and allow for new possibili-
ties. In this way, it is like the child’s experience in imaginative play.21
 Buber seems to agree that creativity and the discovery of  form also occur in the realm 
of  the “in-between”. Maurice Friedman suggests that Buber views “a work of  art is not the 
impression of  natural objectivity nor the expression of  spiritual subjectivity. It is the witness of  
the relation between the human substance and the substance of  thing. Art is “the realm of  ‘be-
tween’ which has become a form”:22 In the creative process, the artist discovers the potentialities 
of  form, as s/he encounters that which is over against the self. But form itself  crystallizes into 
structure, and thus non-immediacy:
[The artist] banishes it to be a ‘structure’. The nature of  this ‘structure’ is to be freed for a timeless 
moment” by meeting the work of  art again, lifting the ban of  distance or crystallization, and 
clasps the form.23
Reflections Upon Culture
In his essay, “The Concept of  the Healthy Individual,” Winnicott suggests that peo-
ple live in three worlds: the inner, the outer, and the transitional—”the area of  cultural ex-
perience.” Cultural experience, Winnicott writes, begins as play, and subsequently “leads 
on to the whole area of  man’s inheritance, including the arts, the myths of  history, the 
slow march of  philosophical thought and the mysteries of  mathematics, and of  group 
management and of  religion.”24 Of  the three worlds, the area of  cultural experience is 
the most variable, Winnicott states. It is also the most healthy, for it is the area not only of  play 
and humor, “but also all the accumulated culture of  the past five to ten thousand years.” It is here 
that a good mind can best operate, and the sense of  trust can be offered and confirmed.
 The dialogical realm, das Zwischenmenschliche, is similarly critical to the preservation of  
culture, believes Buber. Buber, however, transcends his earlier expressions of  romantic folk psy-
chology and mysticism, and insists that culture must incorporate ethical and social dimensions. 
Buber thus uses the realm of  das Zwischenmenschliche as a potential space for the reconstruction of  
human relations within a morally accountable community.25
 In his social philosophy, Buber searches for the elements of  genuine community, where 
real meeting is possible. Often he mentions das Gemeinschaft as a location for das Zwischenmen-
schliche, embracing the “matrix of  warm and trusting relations that had been eclipsed by the 
competitive, calculating relations of  bourgeois urban life.”26 Moreover, it was Buber’s view that 
Gemeinschaft was not simply an irretrievable memory, and could, therefore, be reconstructed. True 
Gemeinschaft, writes Buber, permits “ the Thou to come into being.” Yet in group life as in indi-
vidual existence, it is not the It-world itself, but rather its domination over all of  life that is evil.
 D.W. Winnicott, “The Concept of  the Healthy Individual,” in Home is Where We Start From (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1986), 36.
 Maurice Friedman, Martin Buber: The Life of  Dialogue, 3d ed. rev. (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1976), 81. 
3 Buber, I and Thou, 40.
24 Winnicott, “Healthy Individual,” 35. 
25 Paul Mendes-Flohr, From Mysticism to Dialogue: Martin Buber and the Transformation of  German Social Thought (De-
troit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 13-15.
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 Buber cites the category of  “the essential We” to correspond on the community level to 
the “essential Thou on the level of  self  being.” Similarly, he posits a primitive We on the group 
level, analogous to that of  the primitive Thou on the individual level: “the primitive We precedes 
true individuality and independence, whereas the essential We only comes about when indepen-
dent people have come together in essential relation and directness.”27 Through this essential We, 
humans can transcend the impersonality of  mass culture. As Buber writes in Between Man and 
Man, one “is truly saved from the ‘one’ not by separation but only by being bound up in genuine 
communion.”28
 Buber calls for restructuring of  society “into a community of  communities,” which would 
strive to transform mass society into the essential We of  Gemeinschaft. True community, however, 
can only occur if  people take personal responsibility, and can sacrifice for the group. Buber’s 
social philosophy is far from utopian, realizing how difficult it is in an age of  impersonal mass 
society to redirect human nature towards responsibility for the integrity of  the total community. 
He embraces no one political ideology, but points to varied communities where non-exploitative 
relations predominate.
 Although Winnicott does not speak in similar detail about the dynamics of  cul-
ture, he does view cultural forms as inherently more enabling and creative. Due to 
his social location in Great Britain, Winnicott also seems more pragmatic and posi-
tive towards both monarchy and large-scale democratic government. In his essay, “Some 
Thoughts on the Meaning of  Democracy,” Winnicott considers democracy a more 
mature form of  culture, for instance, in its respect of  privacy through the secret ballot.29 
The main threat to democracy, however, Winnicott writes, is that its people may not be mature 
enough to maintain and nurture it. In this case, totalitarian systems can threaten a people through 
their appeal to demonic certainty, stirring in some individuals a desire to persecute others.
 Winnicott finds that such a desire to persecute, or wish to be persecuted, results from 
a failure of  successful transitional objects, often as a result of  early impingement by others. In 
adult group life, this developmental deficit can lead one particular group to force its illusions 
upon another. Illusion, “which in adult life is inherent in art and religion,” notes Winnicott, 
“becomes the hallmark of  madness when an adult puts too powerful a claim on the credulity of  
others, forcing them to acknowledge a sharing of  illusion that is not their own.”30 Winnicott’s 
insight here may offer some rationale for emergence of  National Socialism, which Buber’s social 
psychology was hard-pressed to comprehend.
 Winnicott observes that the healthy person maintains his self-esteem as well as his doubts, 
and is able to discern the difference between inner and external conflict. “When healthy persons 
come together they each contribute a whole world, because each brings a whole person,” he 
writes. They are capable of  becoming depressed, rather than automatically joining group manias 
and seeking domination of  others.31
 A rich, nurturing sense of  culture can be found in Winnicott’s analogy of  the holding 
environment of  mother and infant to the wider world, which “provides a refuge or fellow feeling 
and the fact that we are all human.” Similar echoes of  this “holding environment” can be found 
 
 
27 Buber, Martin. Between Man and Man (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 202.
 Ibid., 209. 
29 D.W. Winnicott, “Some Thoughts on the Meaning of  the Word Democracy,” in Home Is Where We Start From (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1936), 241.
30 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 3.
3 Winnicott, “The Value of  Depression,” in Home Is Where We Start From (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), 71-79.
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in Buber’s Gemeinschaft, which affirms fellowship and community while countering coercion and 
domination.
 Illness, writes Buber, represents distortion, both because the individual closes himself  
off  from the world and because society rejects the person, refusing to offer confirmation. It is 
critical that a healthy culture, therefore, offer treatment that not merely aims to “integrate” or 
“adjust” an individual to the prevailing society, but that seeks to restore the person’s interrupted 
dialogical relations.
 Finally, both Buber and Winnicott find that healthy communal life requires its members 
to assume ongoing responsibility for the well being of  others in the group. “It is human be-
ings who are likely to destroy the world,” concludes Winnicott. “If  so, we can perhaps die . . . 
knowing that this is not health but fear; it is part of  the failure of  healthy people and healthy 
society to carry its ill members.”32 To care for others means that, for both Winnicott and Buber, 
persons move outside themselves with a newfound sense of  courage. Assuming such respon-
sibility for others encourages and restores genuine relations between persons, and in so doing 
enables the ethical and spiritual regeneration of  the wider world. The transitional space, or das 
Zwischenmenschliche, therefore remains critical for the preservation of  a morally accountable world 
community, where the ability to relate meaningfully to others continues as an ever-present—and 
perduring—reality. 
Laura Praglin is an Assistant Professor of  Social Work at the University of  Northern Iowa
32 Winnicott, “Healthy Individual,” 37.
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